LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.! 



Chap. t. 0..3.3- 



\ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 



Xht Jcvuicc ot tlvc Vermont ^voops. 



AN ORATION 



BEFORE THE 



RE-UNION SOCIETY 



VERMONT OFFICERS, 



Representatives' Hall, Montpelier, Vt., 



November 2, 1882, 
/ 

Bv Lieut. GEO. GRENVILLE BENEDICT. 



MONTPELIER : 

WATCHMAN AND JOURNAL PRESS. 
1882. 




1^4 G 



ORATION 



Mu. President and Brothers of the Re-Union Society : 

The story of the great civil war in which our societ^^ had its 
origin will in time be told, and that more fully than the story 
of any great war in human history. But it will not soon be 
full}' told. Covering more land and water than any other mod- 
ern war ; enlisting the services of over three millions of soldiers, 
who faced each other in nearl}' a hnnd-red important battles and 
in lesser engagements without count ; seen b}' more eye-wit- 
nesses capable of describing its events than any other war since 
the world was made ; a war about whicli more was written and 
printed in the time of it than any other war, — the veiy abund- 
ance of materials for the historian adds immensely to the labor 
and duration of his task. The four thousand solid pages thus 
far issued of the Official Records of the War, comprising simpl}' 
the orders and otflcial reports of military operations in the field, 
which the government is slowly printing, barely covers the first 
nine months of the war and but one important battle. Histo- 
ries of campaigns and passages of the war are appearing year 
by year, more numerous, more careful and more valuable than 
in the preceding years. To sift fact from fancy, in all this mass 
of statement ; to clear away the rubbish and let the solid truth 
appear ; to decide the disputed claims, so inevitable and so 



multitudinous in military matters ; to determine the events of 
absolute importance, amid the world of achievements of lesser 
and only comparative magnitude — is a work of time, and of not 
a little lime. The latest contribution to the history of the war 
of 1812 has appeared within the past 3'ear, nearly seventy years 
after its close. It may be as many before the history of the war 
for the Union is fully written. 

The fermentation of the seventeen years since the close of 
the war has been in part a process of unsettling. Time has se- 
riously lessened some militar}^ reputations. The possession of 
the Confederate archives and reports, and the labors of southern 
historians, enable us to see many events from two sides which 
before were onh* visible from one ; and as the years go on and 
facts develop and theories disappear many things take on a dif- 
ferent aspect. Yet many things, of course, have been settled — 
and are now as plain as they ever will be. In the hour which 
on short notice and with too scanty preparation I have under- 
taken to fill, I propose to mention some of the points in the war 
record of Vermont which have passed beyond serious dispute. 

First, then, it will never be denied that the response of our 
Green Mountain State to the call of the imperilled Union was 
a worthy one. 

Vermont was pledged to a prompt and patriotic response by 
her ancestral fame. It was not a low example of patriotism 
and self-sacrifice that was set to their descendants by the 
founders of our State. As you remember, the first announce- 
ment of the organization of the independent State of Vermont 
to the Continental Congress, was accompanied by the offer to 
Congress of " the services of more than five thousand hardy 
soldiers, capable of bearing arms in defence of American lib- 
erty." That was the offer of a man from every family, in a 



new commuiiit3' where the strong arms that liacl but begun to 
subdue the forest, could not be spared without sore privation 
in the rustic homes and households. In her next communica- 
tion to Congress, Vermont, though not yet admitted to the 
Union, offered to furnish "from year to year, an equal number 
of troops in the field, in proportion to their number, as Con- 
gress shall estimate the quotas of the several States in propor- 
tion to their numbers — which troops shall be clothed, quartered 
and paid by the State of Vermont." You know how the infant 
State fulfilled these pledges. Her first regiment (Col. Seth 
Warner's) , like the First Vermont Volunteers in the late war, 
was organized for temporary service. Her next was a full conti- 
nental regiment which served throughout the war for indepen- 
dence. The entire militia of Vermont turned out to Benning- 
ton in 1777, though only a part could reach the ground in time to 
take part in the battle. At a later date we find the State in 
her penury laying a tax for the support of 1,500 men in the 
army. Vermonters took the first forts captured from the Brit- 
ish ; planned and furnished troops for the first invasion of 
Canada ; formed a third of Stark's force at Bennington ; de- 
fended their own territory and part of New York, without help 
from the rest of the continental arm}' ; fought side by side with 
their brothers throughout the Revolutionary war, and made the 
title of Green Mountain Boja synonym for courage, hardihood, 
effective fighting and unselfish patriotism. In proportion to 
means and numbers no State of the old Thirteen gave more or 
suffered more or accomplished more for American liberty. 

In man}' respects, however, our State was far less ready to 
answer a call to arms in 1861 than it was in 1775. The eighty 
years between the Revolution and the Rebellion had made 
many States populous and wealthy, but had made Vermont 



neither. For nearly- a quarter of a century the State had been 
stationary in population and nearly so in property. The times 
when every Vermonter was as hand}^ with the rifle as with the 
axe, had passed away. The militar}' spirit had become dor- 
mant and apparently extinct. The State finally ceased to 
make appropriations for the militia or to require an}^ military 
duty of the citizens. The June trainings became a farce and 
then but the memor}' of a farce. For ten 3'ears previous to 
1854 there was not the semblance of any military organization 
in the State. The few independent military companies organ- 
ized in the six 3'ears following were maintained more for 
amusement than with an^^ anticipation of actual service. The 
mutterings of the coming storm were indeed unmistakable, but 
they seemed to fall on deaf ears. To one who looks back 
on that time in the light of subsequent events, the unwillingness 
of our people to believe in the possibilit}' of civil war, even 
while the southern States were arming and seizing United 
States forts and arsenals and moving rapidly on in the forma- 
tion of a separate government, is the strangest feature of the 
situation. The messenger who came to Governor Fairbanks in 
the first week in January, 1861, from the one man in New 
England who was fully alive to the imminence of the war, to 
sa}^ that he was buying overcoats and ball cartridges for the 
Massachusetts militia, and that he hoped the governor of Ver- 
mont would at once commence similar preparations for the 
defense of the National Capital, took back to Governor Andrew 
no very encouraging response. When, three weeks later, the 
first indication that our State authorities had reached the point 
of action came, in an order to the captains of the companies of 
uniformed militia, directing them to ascertain how many men 
in their companies would respond to a call for troops to main- 



tiiiu the Constitution and the law, but ten captains responded 
in writing. The}' reported an aggregate of 376 men armed, 
after a fashion, partially equipped, and willing to march, if 
ordered, to the defense of Washington. The captains of three 
or four more companies probabl}' responded verball}-. But at 
most the State had of citizen soldiers less than enough to form 
a single regiment, while to arm a lev}- it had, all told, 957 
muskets, most of them smooth-bores and some of them ancient 
flint-locks, and 503 Colt's pistols, described in the report of 
Quartermaster-General Davis, as "of no practical use what- 
ever ! " If it be true, as Gen. W. T. Sherman has said, 
that " when the war came no people on earth were less pre- 
pared for it than those of the United States," it is also true 
that the people of no State were less prepared for it than those 
of Vermont. Yet the unreadiness of our people was not owing 
to the apathy of stupidity or fear ; it was rather the result of a 
devotion to the Union so absolute that its possessors could not 
find it in their hearts to believe that it was not shared by any 
considerable portion of their countrymen, and of a confident 
trust that the better impulses of the southern masses would yet 
counteract the traitorous schemes of their leaders. 

Unwilling as the}' were to believe in the possibility of the 
dreadful alternative of civil war, the attitude of the Vermonters 
towards treason and rebellion was at no time doubtful. It was 
a Vermont judge, sitting in the United States Circuit Court in 
New York City, who more than three months before Sumter 
was fired on, electrified the country by a memorable charge to 
the grand jury, in which he defined the seizure of Federal prop- 
erty by the southern militia as acts of treason, and charged 
that " any individual owing allegiance to the United States who 
shall furnish these southern traitors with arms or munitions of 



war, vessels or means of transportation, or materials which will 
aid the traitors in carrying out their traitorous purposes, is 
clearly liable to be indicted, tried, convicted and executed as a 
traitor — for death is the penalty of treason." This was a bold 
utterance to be made in a city filled with southerners and south- 
ern sympathizers, many of them engaged in supplying ships 
and arms and ammunition to the traitors — a city whose mayor 
had apologized to Senator Toombs of Georgia for the stoppage, 
by the New York police, of a shipment of arms to arm the mil- 
itia of that State ; and who had hinted a threat that in case of 
war New York would set herself up as a free city, aloof 
from allegiance to either government. It was a Vermont Sen- 
ator, who in January, 1S61, introduced the first and I believe 
the only practical measure of resistance to the rebellion that 
was proposed in that Congress, in his bill authorizing the Pres- 
ident to close the ports of the seceded States, and suspending 
the United States mail service in those States. And in these 
expressions Judge Smalley and Senator Collamer but spoke the 
loyalty and purpose of the Vermonters of both political parties - 
When the actual call to arms came, you remember how Ver- 
mont rose with the great uprising of the North. We could not, 
indeed, reply to Sumter, as our forefathers replied to Lexing- 
ton, with the capture of a walled fortress. We could not send 
a regiment to march with the Massachusetts Sixth through re- 
bellious Baltimore. But the proclamation of our governor, 
convening the Legislature to provide men and arms, bore even 
date with Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, and antedated by at least 
a day all similar proclamations of other governors ; and our 
first regiment was ready in time to make the first permanent 
occupation of the soil of Virginia made by the troops of the 
Union, and to take a hand in the fu-st battle. 



As to numbers furnished for the war, it is, I think, not put- 
ting it too strong to say that Vermont sent a greater proportion 
of her able-bodied men into the service than any other State, 
Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, at the meeting of the Societ}^ 
of the Army of the Potomac, in 1876, said proudly of his State : 
"She furnished [to the war] one in seventeen of her population 
— a ratio larger than that of the conscription of 1814, in 
France." Pennsylvania was a great, wealth}' and populous 
State, full of able-bodied workmen, and having an immense 
pecuniary stake in the preservation of the Union. If our little 
community, far from the theatre of war and from danger of in- 
vasion, did as well as the Keystone State of the Republic, she 
did well. But, computed on the general basis of all such com- 
parisons, the credits on the books of the Provost Marshal Gen- 
eral of the United States, Vermont furnished for the war not 
one in seventeen, but one in ten of her population. One or two 
other States, perhaps, furnished as large a proportion ; but no 
other had so small a proportion of its citizens liable to and fit 
for military dut}' — with the possible exception of Massachusetts, 
whose large excess of female population must of course be taken 
into the account. No other State, however — not Massachusetts 
or Maine or New Hampshire, — had been so depleted of young, 
able and enterprising men, the very class which supplied the 
Volunteers, as was Vermont. The census of 1880 shows that 
there are more native Vermonters domiciled in other States than 
are now residing within our borders ; — and if that was not the 
case in 1860, the fact could not have come much short of it. 
Of course every State had many sons who fought in the ranks 
of the regiments of other States ; but not one, I venture to say, 
had so many as Vermont. A count of the native Vermonters 
in the Second Minnesota regiment, made on Capitol Hill, Wash- 
2 



10 

ington, in Jul}', 1861, showed that 170, or one-fifth of the aggre- 
gate of the regiment, were born in Vermont ; yet there were 
several Western States in which native Vermonters were more 
plenty than in Minnesota. If the full statistics could be obtained 
the}' would probabl}' show that as many men born in Vermont 
were included in the rolls of other States, as in our own ; while 
the muster rolls of our Vermont regiments show a very small 
sprinkling of men of other nativities. The bone and sinew, life, 
energy, intelligence, of our commonwealth, was under arms or 
engaged in the support of the troops in the field. No other 
communit}-, it is safe to sa}', so nearly approached unanimity in 
loyal sentiment. No man occupying any oflflcial or representa- 
tive position in our State gave any aid or sympathy to the re- 
bellion. The list of northern traitors consigned to Forts Warren 
and La Fayette contains the name of no Vermonter. The num- 
ber of our citizens who by woi'd or thought opposed the war, 
was the merest fraction. * 

Our people gave of their means as freely as of their men. A 
frugal folk, unused to large expenditures for anything, Ver- 
mont's first appropriation for war purposes was a million 
dollars. And the New York World said of it, without contra- 
diction from any quarter, "Many have done nobly, but none, 
resources considered, have equalled this." Our outlay of 
money for the recruiting, equipment and pay of troops was 
nine millions. This on a grand list of $970,690 (in 1861), 
representing a total valuation of a little over eighty five millions 
of property and money, for taxation. The towns of Vermont, 
in their municipal capacity, expended for war purposes over 
five millions. That sum is the portion of our war expenses 
that was paid without thought or hope of repayment. I have 
not the means of comparison of this outlay with that of many 



11 

other States, but if Vermont paid as freel}' as the nol)le Old 
Ba}' State it will be admitted that she did well. The cities 
and towns of Massachusetts paid for war expenses $13,010,867, 
being $10.74 for each inhabitant. The towns of Vermont ex- 
pended $5,215,787, being $16.55 for each inhabitant. The 
propert}^ of Vermont, as valued for taxation, was, in 1861, 
$85,834,209. The taxable valuation of Massachusetts for the 
same j-ear was $876,602,264. After all allowances are made 
for dift'erences in valuations, Massachusetts had at least eight 
times as much taxable property as Vermont. The war outlay 
of the State and towns of Massachusetts aggregated forty-two 
millions. The corresponding outla}' of the State and towns of 
Vermont aggregated nine millions. Massachusetts paid in round 
numbers five dollars on every hundred of her propert}', real and 
personal. Vermont paid ten dollars and a half on every 
hundred. 

The Vermont ti'oops cost the government less than the 
average of the army and probably less than those of an}' other 
State. This was because Vermont earl}' adopted the method 
of strengthening her regiments in the field b}' additions of fresh 
recruits, instead of organizing additional regiments, and kept 
it up more largely, I think, than any other State. The average 
final aggregate of the Vermont regiments was upwards of 1800. 
The similar aggregate of the Massachusetts and New Jersey 
regiments was about 1500 ; of the Iowa regiments 1400 ; of the 
Ohio regiments 1300. The proportion of commissioned oflScers 
to the rank and file in the Vermont regiments was thus less 
than the average ; and as the pay of the lowest commissioned 
officer was equal to the pay of eight privates, the average cost 
of our regiments to the government was proportionate!}' re- 
duced. 



12 

But if the ti-oops of Vermont were cheaper to the Govern- 
ment than the average, was the service they rendered less val- 
uable than the average — less effective, less costly of life and 
limb? Let us look at this. The limits of this occasion will not 
permit anything like a full review of the services rendered by the 
Vermont troops. Suppose we select the twelve most prominent 
campaigns and battles of the wai* — and see what the Vermonters 
had to do in them. We ma}- take the first battle because it was 
the first ; Bull Run, because, as Mr. William Swinton says, it 
showed that the war was to be a war and not a sixty days' riot ; 
Shiloh as the defeat of the first formidable aggressive campaign 
of the Confederate Armies in the West ; the Peninsular Cam- 
paign of 18G2, memorable for rebel successes; Gettysburg, as 
the defeat of the greatest rebel invasion of the East ; Vicks- 
burg, because it opened Mississippi to the Union ; the Wilder- 
ness, which inaugurated the " hammering out" of the Confed- 
eracy ; Cedar Creek, as the most romantic battle of the war ; 
Atlanta and the march to the sea, which showed that the Con- 
federacy was onl}' a shell ; Nashville, which annihilated the re- 
bellion at the West ; and the capture of Petersburg, which was 
the capture of Richmond and the collapse of the Confederacy. 
In three of these great critical campaigns the Vermont troops 
had no share. We had no regiment at Shiloh or in the Army 
of the Cumberland or under Sherman. But it is certainly no- 
ticeable that in three-fourths of them, the troops of a little State 
whose quota formed but an eightieth part of the grand Union 
aggregate, should have been engaged and should have rendered 
important service. 

Let us consider this somewhat in detail. The first actual 
collision of the war, — for Sumter was the bloodless battering 
down of an almost silent fortress, and the affair at Philippi, 



13 

West Virginia, was an unresisted i out of a rebel battalion — was 
at Big Bethel. It is known as the first ' ' battle " of the war, 
and in its consequences, of encouragement of the South, was 
really an important battle. Planned in ignorance and folly, in- 
tended to be the surprise of an outpost where there was no 
outpost, and the capture of formidable works, which Gen. But- 
ler and Major Winthrop, the authors of the plan, supposed to 
be on the South instead of the North side of Back River, it ,is a 
comfort to remember that no Vermonter was in any way res- 
ponsible for the scheme. Gen. Phelps disapproved of the ex- 
pedition as planned, and Col. Washburn counselled a return 
after the night collision of Union regiments. When the en- 
closed earth-work and I'ifle pits of Big Bethel — manned by 1,500 
men and seven pieces of artillery — were reached, it was of course 
found that Colonels Magruder and Hill of the Confederate army 
had not been trained at West Point to put their main works be- 
fore instead of behind the natural defences. The attack on 
them as conducted by Gen. Pierce, consisted chiefly in march- 
ing regiments to and fro on his side of the creek and under 
cover of the woods. The only actual assault by the Union in- 
fantr}' was made by a battalion of Vermont and Massachusetts 
troops, commanded b}' a Vermonter. Col. Washburn's was the 
only command that crossed the creek or inflicted an}' damage on 
the enemy. It was an inglorious affair, but noteworthy because it 
exhibited at the outset the mettle of our Vermont soldiers ; and 
the declaration of an eye-witness from another State will not be 
gainsaid : that "if the other troops had done their duty as well 
and gone as far as those of Massachusetts and Vermont, Big 
Bethel would not have headed a long list of Federal reverses." 

At Bull Run the Second Vermont regiment was not put in 
till the day was already lost. Its officers found no organized 



14 

body of Union troops in sight, outside of their own brigade, 
when the}- went into action. The regiment rendered very im- 
portant service in checking pursuit, while our army was with- 
drawn across Bull Run. The Richmond papers particularized 
the Vermont regiment as one whose fire inflicted heavy loss on 
their side ; and the remark of Col. O. O. Howard, their brigade 
commander, in a subsequent address to the regiment, was a 
fair epitome of their conduct: "Cool and steady as regu- 
lar troops," said he, "you stood on the brow of that hill 
and fired your thirty-six rounds, and retired only at the 
command of your Colonel." Our Vermont Second appeared 
to no disadvantage as compared with an}' regiment that crossed 
Bull Run on that disastrous day ; and it is worth remembering 
that the brigade of McDowell's army, which, taking coolness 
and stern determination from their commander, moved last along 
the Centre ville ridge and covered the retreat of our army, was 
commanded by a gallant son of Vermont, Col. Israel B. Rich- 
ardson. 

The universal mortification at the want of results from Gen. 
McClellan's splendid preparations in the Peninsular campaign 
of 1862, is somewhat alleviated for Vermonters, by the fact 
that the only movement below Yorktown that could be called 
"rapid and vigorous," — which are the adjectives applied to it 
by Gen. Magruder, of the Confederate arm}' — was the assault 
on the enemy's works at Lee's Mills by a battalion of Vermont 
troops. Had they been supported by Gen. McClellan, instead 
of withdrawn, the thin line along which a few thousand Confed- 
erates so long held back three times their number would have 
been pierced, and the whole history of the campaign probably 
changed. " Regret that the movement was not pushed," says 
Gen. Webb, the latest historian of the Peninsular campaign. 



15 



"is enhanced by Gen. Smith's reflection, that among the four 
companies of the third Vermont, who first crossed Warwick 
Creek, there were more individual acts of lieroism performed, 
than he ever before read of, in a great battle." If more com- 
plimentary mention is made of any regiment in that campaign, 
I have failed to find it. So at Williamsburgh and in the battles 
of the Seven Days' Retreat, the regiments of the old Vermont 
brigade showed themselves eager in advance, and orderly, 
though sullen and quick to turn, in retreat. 

In the first expedition against Vicksburg, our Seventh regi- 
ment, though not engaged in any pitched battle, for in fact 
there was none, sustained an amount of suffering and loss from 
hardship and exposure in the swamps and in the digging of 
Gen. Butler's cut-off canal, such as no regiment endured in 
battle. The well were not enough to care for the sick and 
bury the dead, and a regiment over eight hundred strong was 
reduced to one hundred effective -men. 

No detailed history of the second Vicksburg campaign can 
omit the siege of Port Hudson, which was in effect an outoost 
of Vicksburg, or ought to omit mention of the brilliant service 
of the Eighth Vermont. It requires a stern and genuine qual- 
ity of courage to advance where brave men have fallen back, 
and to restore a failing and desperate assault. This was twice 
the duty of our Eighth regiment at Port Hudson. In Gen. 
Banks' first attempt to carry the enemy's works the brigade of 
Col. Stephen Thomas formed the third line of the assaulting 
force, and the Eighth Vermont had the right, and led the 
advance of that brigade. The sturdy resistance met by the 
first two lines in front of the outer defences of Port Hudson, 
had brought them to a stand, when Thomas's brigade was 
ordered forward. Passing through the broken lines of battle 



16 

before them, the Eighth and the other regiments of the brigade 
moved steadily upon the Confederate outworks, drove the 
enemy from them, pursued them through ravines and fallen 
timber, killing many and capturing more, and did not stop till 
they had driven the remainder into their main fortifications. 
At the second assault, two weeks later, the Eighth led the 
storming column, which was preceded by a line of skirmishers, 
a regiment with hand grenades, and a regiment carrying cotton 
bags to fill the hostile trenches. The grenadiers and cotton- 
baggers found the fire too hot for them to face. Stepping 
through their broken files and over the bodies of those who 
were hugging the ground for shelter, the Eighth made a gallant, 
though hopeless, dash at the Confederate parapets. Eighty 
men, among them Adjutant Spaulding, fell in five minutes, but 
followed by the brave troops of the brigade, the regiment 
pressed straight on till a few men touched the opposing breast- 
works, still crowned by a line of fire. To do more was a 
simple impossibility ; but the Eighth held a position close to 
the Confederate works all that day. The brigade commander. 
Col. Smith of the 114th New York, fell mortallj- wounded 
while rallying his command, with the assistance of Major Bars- 
tow of the Eighth Vermont, who was acting as his Assistant 
Adjutant General. The Eighth lost one hundred and forty 
men in killed and wounded, or nearly a third of its number, in 
those charges, but gained a reputation for bravery which it 
never lost. 

The battle-maps of Gett3-sburg, prepared by the War De- 
partment — the most careful and elaborate maps ever made of 
an}' great battle — have ended disputes as to the more important 
movements and locations of that battle. These show, upon the 
flank of Picket's column, and farther to the front than an}' 



17 

other Union force, a Vermont brigade. Southern and Northern 
historians alike have made it plain that if any one movement 
on the Union side can be called the decisive movement of the 
decisive day, and so the turning point of the battle and so of 
the war, it was the charge of Stannard's brigade. For the honor 
of originating a movement so brilliant and so famous, it is sur- 
prising that there have not been more claimants. But the 
credit of the order will forever remain due to the brain, nerve 
and intuition of a Vermont brigadier. That it was executed 
under heavy fire, with the promptness and precision of battal- 
ion drill, was the declaration of Stannard's report; — and that, 
too, stands undisputed. 

I pass on to The Wilderness — perhaps the least understood 
and most insufficiently described of the battles of the army of 
the Potomac. The curtain of tangled forest which protected 
the right of Gen. Lee's army south of the Rapidan, and which 
still shrouds the slopes and ravines of that bloody field, has 
seemed to envelope the battle in mystery, and description 
of many of its details has been and will always be impossible. 
The title of this battle to prominence, however, is sufficiently 
clear. It was the first battle fought by Gen. Grant after he 
took the chief command of the Union armies and the first in 
which he had to meet the ablest general of the Confederacy. 
On it rested the hope of the Summer campaign, and largely 
Grant's reputation as a general. His problem was to take 
through a wilderness covered with dwarf evergreens and scrub 
oak and an undergrowth of bristling shrubs, threaded by nar- 
row roads with which his antagonist was far more familiar than 
himself, an army, covering nearly a hundred miles of highway 
with its 110,000 men and 4000 army wagons. Grant knew 
that one day was his, while as yet his movement was unfolding 



18 

to his opponent. The next day he must expect to fight, for he 
had an antagonist on whose want of insight or of promptness in 
action it would not do to count. Gen. Lee's plan was a simple 
one, and had probably been long formed in view of the contin- 
gency. It was to strike our army on the flank, cut it in two, 
roll up its halves, divided and unable to support each other, and 
to drive what he did not destroy back across the Rapidan, as 
he had driven Hooker a year before. The roads in such a re- 
gion more than ever determined all military movements. In 
general terms Grant must move by the roads running from 
North to South, and Lee must strike him by the cross roads 
running from West to East. On the 4th of May, 1864, Grant 
plunged into the Wilderness. His army marched unmolested 
for one day. On the second day of its march, the "Brock 
Road," so called, in the centre of tlie Wilderness, a North and 
South road, was the key of the region. It is so called by Gen. 
Badeau — who was on Grant's stafl", and high in his confidence, 
and who wrote with the reports and plans and suggestions of 
Grant before him, so that his account of this campaign may be 
almost considered Gen. Grant's account of it, — by Swinton, and 
by other critical historians of the war. 

The key point of the Brock Road was the point of intersection 
of the Orange Plank Road, over which Lee sent the corps which 
was to strike the outstretched column of his enemy. To this 
point early on the morning of the 5th, Gen, Meade, (through 
whom all of Grant's orders were issued), sent a division, with 
orders to secure that point and hold it at all hazards. The 
force thus sent, we may be sure was selected with care. It was 
not a division of the Second Corps, which corps was to occupy 
the Brock Road, but a part of another corps. It was the divis- 
ion of the army, which in the opinion of its commanders, would 



19 

be surest to reach the key-point in time, and to hold it against 
all comers. It was the Second Division of the Sixth Corps, 
commanded b}- Gen. G. W. Getty, one of the bravest, ablest 
and most modest of the general officers of the army, — or rather 
it was three brigades of Getty's Division. One of these was 
the old Vermont brigade. It was the largest of the three, out- 
numbering each of the others by about 800 men, and was as- 
suredly not second to either or to any In-igade of that splendid 
lighting division, in marching, fighting or staying qualities. 
The brigade commander was Gen. Lewis A. Grant, and the 
regimental commanders were Colonel Newton Stone of the 2d ; 
Colonel T. O. Seaver of the 3d ; Colonel Geo. P. Foster of the 
4th ; Lieut. Colonel J. R. Lewis of the oth, and Colonel E. L. 
Barney of the 6lh. 

Gen. Badeau tells us how the trust imposed in Getty and 
his division was repaid. " Gett}^" he says, "with a single 
division first [that is before tlie corps which Lee had sent to 
seize the point] reached the critical point and held it after- 
wards for hours in the presence of double his own force, 
although Lee in person commanded in front. And when 
Hancock with the Second corps arrived, it was the National 
troops and not the rebels who made the first assault." '' Held" 
here means held by the most stubborn and bloody fighting. 
The troops in turn attacked and repulsed l)y Getty's division 
were two divisions of Hill's corps, viz. : Heth's division num- 
bering 8,000, and Wilcox's numbering 9,000 efl^eclive men. 
Getty's division numbered 7,000. Gen. Lee in his report of 
the battle, sa3s of the fight on the Plank road : "The enemy 
concentrated upon Gen. Hill, who with Heth's and Wilcox's 
divisions successfully resisted the repeated and most desperate 
assaults." Gen. Lee was not given to the use of strong adjec- 



20 

tives in his reports, and when he calls the fighting "most 
desperate," we may be sure it was so. There was, however, 
no great "concentration" upon Hill's corps. The force which 
attacked him was simply Getty's three brigades. The impor- 
tance of tJjis service is thus estimated by Swinton : "This 
junction of roads was a strategic point of the first importance, 
and if Hill should be able to seize it he would interpose effectu- 
ally between the two Union columns [the 5th and 2d corps 
of our army]. Discovering this danger, Gen. Meade early in 
the day directed a division of the Sixth corps under Gen. 
Gett}-, to hold stoutly the position until Hancock's junction 
could be effected. While the latter was still far off, Getty had 
begun to feel the pressure of the enemy, and hour by hour it 
grew more heavy on him. Bu* he held his post immovably, 
till towards three o'clock in the afternoon, the welcome cheer 
of Hancock's approaching troops was heard." 

But before Hancock arrived Getty had struck Hill with the 
vigor which Gen. Lee characterized as "most desperate," 
Gett}' moved against an enem}- alread}' moving to attack him. 
The struggle partook of the peculiar characteristics of the battle 
of the Wilderness, — unseen movements of troops, terrific volleys 
of musketry bursting at close range from the thickets ; charges 
through woods so dense that a field officer could scarce see more 
than the line of a company ; sudden appearances and disappear- 
ances of bodies of troops through the smoke and jungle ; regi- 
ments on each side hugging the ground for shelter, not daring 
to rise for either advance or retreat, yet keeping up incessant 
fusillades ; an almost Indian warfare in the forest. Hill had two 
men to Getty's one, but he secured no adA^antage, and when 
night compelled a cessation of the struggle our men still held 
the Brock Road. The desperate braverj- and dogged resistance 



21 

of Getty's division saved the tinny of the Potomac from tremen- 
dous disaster ; and the tables of casualties show what share the 
Vermont brigade had in the work. A thousand Vermonters fell 
that afternoon, and lay either stark in death or till brought in 
by the searching parties which were seeking the wounded all 
night at peril of their lives, for the enemy fired at every light or 
noise. There was little rest and less sleep for our veterans that 
May night, and at daylight the fighting was renewed. 

Longstreet had been marching all night to the support of 
Hill, and the Ninth corps to the aid of Warren and the Fifth 
corps ; and Grant and Lee had each decided to attack at da}- 
light. 

Lee's main eftbrt was still to secure the approach b}^ the 
Orange Plank road, to the Brock Road. At first the advantage 
was on our side. Hancock had placed two divisions of his own 
corps, the 2d, in front of Gettj^'s division, and attacked at 5 
o'clock with great vigor, while Wadsworth's division of the 
Fifth corps assaulted Hill's right. His lines gave way at once, 
and he was driven back a mile or more, till Lee's headquarters 
were in sight. At this juncture Longstreet arrived, in force 
sufficient not only to check Hancock's advance, but to attack 
in turn, and with superior numbers. Under his vehement attack 
the divisions in front of Getty gave way and were forced back 
over all the ground they had gained. Back rolled the tide of 
battle till it struck the line in which stood the Vermont 
brigade. It was the last line left to guard the junction 
of the roads, and there was no reserve. The situation 
was critical in the extreme, for there was still a wide 
gap on Hancock's left between the 2d and 5th corps, which 
Burnside with the 9th corps had been expected to fill, but 
he had not yet arrived. The fate of the day and of the 



22 

army again depended on the steadiness of Getty's veterans. 
Wlieaton's brigade had suffered seriously the da}' before, and 
our Vermont brigade had lost a man out of every three in the 
ranks, and many of its best officers. Of the regimental com- 
manders of the day before but one was left. Col. Stone of the 
2d had been killed, and Lt.-Col. S. E. Pingree took his com- 
mand. Col. Foster of the 4th had been seriouslj^ wounded, 
and Major Pratt succeeded him. Lt.-Col. Lewis of the otli 
had lost an arm and Major Dudley took his place. Col. 
Barney of the 6th was shot through the head with a mortal 
wound, and Lt.-Col. Hale assumed command of the regiment. 
Eleven captains and nine lieutenants had been killed, and 
thirty commissioned officers of companies wounded. But the 
survivors faced the new emergency with as grim determination 
as ever. Behind a low breastwork of old logs, thrown up by the 
enem}' the day before, they awaited Longstreet's attack. Ife 
expected no more serious opposition than he had thus far met 
that day. "We thought," he said in conversation subse- 
quently with Mr. Swinton, " that we had a second Bull Run on 
you." He never was more mistaken. Again and again his 
lines advanced to the attack and as often went back in disorder, 
Longstreet fell (by a voile}' from his own side.) and Gen. Lee 
assumed direction of the assault in person. But it was all of 
no use. His repulse was always complete in front of the 
Vermont brigade. On their right Wadsworth's division was 
driven back, leaving the body of their brave commander in the 
hands of the enemy. On their left line after line gave way. 
Facing now to the front and now to the flank, they held their 
position for three hours, till the enemy had pushed quite 
around their left flank to their I'ear, when amid almost 
universal disorder all around them, thev moved back to 



S3 

their old stand in front of tlie Brock road, and from this, 
though once more attacked, they were not dislodged. It 
had fallen to them twice to hold the key of the region, 
and the}' held it to the end. The two other brigades of 
Getty's division were permitted that night to return to 
the Sixth corps ; but Gen. Hancock declared that he could 
not spare the Vermont brigade, and it stayed and held its 
position on the plank road through the third da}', and until 
Lee withdrew his array and Grant resumed his forward march. 
The value of the service rendered by Getty's division on those 
two terrible days can hardly be exaggerated, and the list of 
killed and wounded shows on what part of his command fell the 
heaviest burden of the fighting. The killed and wounded of the 
first Vermont brigade numbered 1,232, very equally divided 
among the five regiments. It was one of thirty-one in- 
fantry brigades actively engaged in the battle of the Wilderness. 
Its casualties were one-eleventh of the entire casualties of 
Grant's arm}', in the battle. There were no captures of any 
considerable number from its ranks. The number reported 
missing were but a small fraction, and a portion of them, it is 
known, belonged in the list of killed and wounded. It was a 
frightful proportion of loss b}' deaths and wounds, — the loss of 
ever}' other man in the brigade. But those lives were dearly 
sold. Our boys went into the first day's fight with fifty rounds 
of ammunition in their boxes and pockets, and expended them 
all the first day. They were supplied afresh for the second. 
They were cool and fired low. As they fought some of the 
time behind breastworks, the front of which they piled with 
Confederate dead, it would be fair to pi'esume that they inflicted 
heavier loss than they suffered. But though Gen. Lee 
never made any report of his losses in that battle, this is not 



24 

left altogether to surmise. The field return of the army of 
Northern Virginia for the 20th of April, 1864 — two weeks be- 
fore the battle — is on file at Washington. On that date Gen. 
Hill reported, for his corps, 20,644 enlisted men, present for 
duty. On the 8th of May, the day after the battle of the Wil- 
derness, Gen. Jubal Early took command of Hill's corps, and 
Earl}^ says, in his memoir, that it then numbered 13,000 mus- 
kets. If this was so, the Confederate corps which received the 
chief attention of Getty's division, lost over 7,000 men in that 
battle — or a full third of its number; and as Gen. Longstreet 
has admitted that the repulse of his corps was also largely the 
work of Getty's division, a heavy addition of Confederate casu- 
alties must stand credited to that noble division. Of that divis- 
ion the Vermont brigade has been rightly called the back bone, 
and Gen. Gett}' was wont ever after to speak of the Vermont 
troops as steadiest of the stead}', and brave as the bravest, and 
as having no superiors as fighters, among any troops of any 
country. 

Our First brigade was not the only Vermont organization 
that rendered good service in the Wilderness. The 10th Ver- 
mont regiment was in the 3d division of the Sixth corps. The 
17th Vermont and the 3d Vermont Battery were attached to 
the Ninth corps. The First Vermont Cavalry were there under 
Sheridan, and three Vermont companies of sharpshooters were 
with the Second corps. All of these, but the battery, were 
actively engaged ; but my limits will permit no fuller mention 
of their share of the battle. 

The oft told story of Cedar Creek need not be here retold. 
It was one man's victory, more than any other of the war ; but 
even Sheridan might not have been able to pluck victory from 
the jaws of defeat, without some rall3'ing point — some solid 



2o 

uub of resistance, round which his arm}- could be reassembled. 
He found such a nub when he found Getty's division holding a 
firm front to the enemy while all other portions of the army 
were in full retreat. He tells us this himself. His report of 
the battle says that the only infantry he found opposing the 
enem}^ when he reached the front, was Getty's division, and 
that it was on Getty's line he reformed his army for the grand 
advance. Getty's report says his division had held that posi- 
tion " unsupported for over an hour after all other troops had 
left the field." When Sheridan rode up to the line of the old 
brigade he first found things "■ all right," and they remained 
right till the First Vermont Cavalry closed the day, in the dusk 
of the evening, by the greatest capture of rebel artillery ever 
made b}' a single regiment in a field battle. It may not be 
possible to substantiate this proud claim by statistical proof, 
for no catalogue of such captures, so far as I am aware, exists : 
but no Vermonter has ever heard it successfully disputed. 
The captures made by the Fifth New York Cavalry, who 
accompanied the First Vermont in that charge, which scooped 
in three miles of Confederate guns and wagons, stood next to 
those of the Vermont troopers ; but were short of those made by 
Our boys, both in the numbers of Rebel guns captured and of 
Union guns recaptured. 

Of course all understand that the twenty-three confederate field 
pieces taken by the First Vermont Cavalry were not stormed 
in battery. Our cavalry but gathered in the fruits of the gen- 
eral rout of Early's army ; but the First Vermont Cavalry was 
one of the two regiments selected for this crowning piece ©f 
work. It had done its share of the day's fighting. It was 
part of the cavalry force which assisted Gen. Wright and the 
Sixth Corps in holding Early back, and was fighting when 
4 



•26 



Sheridan reached the front. It led the last charge through 
masses of Confederate infantry. It took and kept and brought 
in the guns with their caissons and wagons and a lively sprink- 
ling of rebel brigadiers and colonels ; and it turned them over 
and took a receipt for them, which is the most eloquent piece of 
paper held by any regiment that took part in the war. 

We come now to the closing struggle in front of Petersburgh. 
Sheridan, at Five Forks, on the first of April, '65, (when the 
First Vermont Cavalry was again engaged and captured many 
prisoners,) had cut off and driven westward the right of Lee's 
army. The final grand assault on the fortifications of Peters- 
burgh was ordered for the next morning. It was to be made 
by Gen. Wright with the Sixth Corps, in the centre, the Ninth 
Corps under Gen. Parke, and Gen. Ord's Corps from the arm}' 
of the James. Gen. Wright had told Gen. Grant that he was 
confident he could go through the lines in front of him, and had 
promised to " make the fur fly " when he got the order. He 
had some reasons for his confidence. Several da^-s previous to 
the assault Gen. L. A. Grant had discovered on the left and 
front of his position an opening in the Confederate line of 
works. This was at the bottom of a ravine, the sides of which 
had been covered with a thick growth of timber. The enemy 
had been cutting these woods near their front for firewood, and 
had thus disclosed the fact that their breastwork and abattis 
did not connect at the bottom of the ravine. The gap was one 
or two rods wide, and to the right of it was another small open- 
ing, made for the teams which had come out for wood. Gen. 
Grant called Gen. Getty's attention to this. Getty notified 
Gen. Wright, and Wright consulted Meade, and the four gen- 
erals went down together to examine the spot, and selected it 
as the point of attack for an "entering wedge." During the 



27 

night of the 1st of April, the Sixth Corps was formed in eclie- 
lon, opposite this point, for the assault. At daybreak a sig- 
nal gun was fired, bj' the Third Vermont Batter3', from Fort 
Fisher, and the wedge went in. It was led b}- the Old Vermont 
Brigade, closed in mass by battalion. The Fifth Vermont was 
the point of the wedge, and Capt. Gould of that regiment, was 
the first man inside the hostile breastworks, and received a 
bayonet wound in the mouth as he sprang over them. The 
Vermont Brigade took the batteries on each side of the ravine, 
brushed the enemy right and left, and made a broad opening 
for the troops that followed. The Sixth Corps, says Swinton, 
swept "the Une of works to its left like a whirlwind, and in 
less than an hour its advance had struck and torn up the South- 
side Eailroad, the long coveted line of Confederate supply." 
The Vermont Brigade, as we have seen, supplied a good part of 
the momentum of this whirlwind, and though the honor of the 
first entrance through the fortifications has been claimed by troops 
thai passed, hours after, through the opening made by the 
Sixth Corps, I believe that it belongs to and will sta}- with our 
Vermont Brigade. Our regiments followed up their advantage 
with splendid energy. They stormed redans, took batteries 
and turned them on the eneni^' ; wherever they fought they led 
instead of followed ; and at nightfall the left of the brigade was at 
the Appomattox River, and its headquarters were at the Turnbull 
House, which had been Lee's headquarters all winter, and it is 
said were occupied by him the night before. 

Other Vermont regiments gained distinction on that day. 
The Tenth Vermont was with the Third division of the Sixth 
Corps, and its colors were the first planted by that division in 
the enemy's works. The Seventeenth Vermont attacked with 
the Ninth corps, and had a share in the capture of Fort Ma- 



hone. The Third battery silenced the guns of Batter}- Owen 
before it was taken b}' the Twenty-fourth Corps. But it cannot 
be doubted tliat of all the blows under which the defences of 
Richmond crumbled, the decisive one was that given by the 
Sixth Corps. It was called, indeed, by Gen. Meade in his 
report, "the decisive movement of the campaign." Next 
morning all that was left of Lee's arm}' was in full retreat, and 
close to the head of the blue column which bore the stars and 
stripes through the blazing streets of Richmond to the Confed- 
erate Capitol, was a Vermont regiment — our Ninth, of Weitzel's 
command. Our Vermont regiments joined in the pursuit of 
Lee, fought him at Sailors' Creek, helped bring him to bay at 
Appomattox, and the First Vermont Cavalry was actually in 
motion for a charge upon his rear, when word came of his 
surrender. Four days after, on the 13th of April, the Seventh 
Vermont was engaged with Confederate cavalry at Whistler, 
near Mobile, in a skirmish which is called by Gen. Richard 
Taylor, the Confederate historian, the last engagement of the 
war. So the Vermont troops fought from first to last. 

If I were attempting an epitome of the services of our Ver- 
mont soldiers, of course I could not omit mention of the 
splendid charge on Marye's Heights, still the admiration of all 
who beheld it, or the holding of the skirmish line, two miles 
long, at Funkstown, against repeated attacks of a rebel line of 
battle, or the fearful fighting of our men in the bloody "Angle" 
at Spottsylvania, or many other lustrous achievements of the 
Vermont boys in blue. But I have been merely running over 
the prominent battles named and noting the specially promi- 
nent pieces of service of the Vermonters in them. It must 
certainly be considered remarkable that in so many of them 
the troops of one of the smallest States — a State whose entire 



29 

quota was but one-eightieth of the aggregate of the Union 
armies — should have taken a distinguished part ; that in so 
man}' crises of the war the result should have rested on their 
valor, steadfastness and skill ; and that in none of these did 
they fail. 

The cost of one of these battles to our State, in life and 
blood, has been mentioned. The aggregate of such sacrifice is 
equali}^ worth}' of note. A report of the Provost Marshal 
General made after the close of the war, gives a table of the 
deaths in action, or from wounds received in action, of the 
troops of the various States. Entire accurac}' is not claimed for 
this table ; but the causes of error were common to the States, 
and there is no reason to doubt that the percentages afford an 
appro ximatel}' accurate basis of comparison. The significance 
of such a table as indicating the fighting character of the troops 
will not be questioned by any soldier. The greatest losses will, 
as a general rule, be found among the troops which are oftenest 
put in places of danger, the troops that fight when others fly, 
and that do not know when they are beaten. In this table 
the States of Kansas and Vermont largely exceed all others 
in the proportion of soldiers killed and mortally wounded. This 
ratio in the Kansas troops exceeds the average of the troops of 
the Union by 25.91 in each thousand. The ratio of Vermont 
exceeds the average by 23.12 in each thousand. Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire come next ; but each lost ten men less 
than Vermont in every thousand. All other States had still 
lower proportions. Vermonters are content to share the honor 
of giving life and blood most freely to the Union, with Kansas, 
a State whose regiments were full of sons of Vermont. 

It is not surprising that a part so truly brilliant as that of our 
Green Mountain State should sometimes have been exaggerated. 



30 

We may not assert, though it has often been asserted, that no 
Vermont flag ever fell into the hands of the eneni}-. The State 
flag of the Ninth Vermont, supposed to have been destro^-ed at 
Harper's Ferry, but found at Richmond among the captured 
Union colors and now preserved in this State House, disproves 
the statement. But it was not yielded to hostile hands in bat- 
tle, and for its surrender, with the other colors of the garrison 
of Harper's Ferry, no Vermont soldier was in the least respon- 
sible. We cannot claim, as has been claimed, that Vermont 
had fewer deserters than any other State. At least the tables 
of the Provost Marshal General do not support that claim, 
though they do show that Vermont was less disgraced by deser- 
tions than any other New England State, and that she had a 
much smaller ratio of deserters than the general ratio of the 
army. It may not be well to claim, as has been claimed, that 
Vermont paid her soldiers better than any other State. As to 
regular Slate pay, doubtless this is true ; but other States paid 
largely in aid to families of soldiers and enormously in bounties ; 
and which paid most is not j-et determined. 

But we can claim, without fear of successful contradiction, 
that tlie people of Vermont were more nearh' unanimous in the 
support of the War for the Union than the people of any other 
State. We can claim that in proportion to her taxable wealth, 
Vermont paid more for the support of the government than the 
wealthiest State and more than most of the States. We can 
sa}' that in proportion to population Vermont had more sons 
in the army of the Union and fewer in the Rebel array than 
any other State. We can sa}' that our State was one of three, 
Massachusetts and New York being the others, whose troops 
fought from Big Bethel to Appomattox. We can claim that in 
proportion to numbers, Vermont gave more lives to the Union 



:^1 

than any other State, save one. We can say that no Vermont 
regiment ever lost a flag in action. We can say that the sol- 
diers of Vermont had at least as much to do in the accomplish- 
ment of the grand result, as any equal number. We can say 
that their service was as intelligent as it was effective. We 
can say that our citizens made less out of the government than 
others ; and that no man can point to an}' colossal fortune 
in this State acquired by army contracts. If these things can 
be said, without desire to lower by a hair's breadth the credit 
due to any other community or to take a single laurel from 
the chaplets of our brothers in the Union Army, why should 
they not be said, and set down for the instruction of posterity? 
My friends, brute courage is not a ver}' admirable quality. 
Military glory, surely, is not the highest glory. If the war 
record of our State illustrates no higher quality, and shines 
with no brighter lustre than these, let us say nothing about it. 
It is because this service was 2)atri otic service, that it is worth 
commemorating. True patriotism is a noble virtue, for at its 
root is the ennobling principle of self sacrifice, honored and 
praiseworth}' on Earth and in Heaven. That we may commend 
this principle to those who follow us : that our children, in time 
of need, may exhibit in lofty exercise, as did our forefathers, 
the virtue which Webster defines as '•'• the passion which aims 
to serve one's countr}-," — the passion which in the words of the 
Latin poet makes it "sweet and honorable to die for country," 
— for this we do well to meet and to fight over the battles and 
chronicle the sufferings of the soldiers of the Union. 





Xhc ^cvxncc of the Hcrmout ^'voops. 

1 


AN ORATION 


lii:F()l{K THE 


RE-UNION SOCIETY 


OK 

VERMONT OFFICERS, 

IN '1' 1 1 E 


Representa rivEs' Hall, Montpelier, Vt., 


NOVEMBER 2. 1882, 


Bv LiFAT. GEO. GRENVILLE BENEDICT. 

• 


montpklip:r: 


W.\T(nM.\N ANP .TOURNAL PRESS. 


1 S 8 2 . 


- 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




013 703 594 7 



